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This paper explores the origins of the great fortunes of the Gilded Age. It relies mainly on two lists
of millionaires published in 1892 and 1902, similar to the Forbes magazine list of the 400 richest Americans.
Manufacturing, as might be expected, was the most important source of Gilded Age fortunes. Many
of the millionaires, moreover, won their fortunes by exploiting the latest technology: Alfred D. Chandler's
"continuous-flow production." A more surprising finding is that wholesale and retail trade, real estate,
and finance together produced more millionaires than manufacturing. Real estate and finance, moreover,
were by far the most important secondary and tertiary sources of Gilded Age fortunes: entrepreneurs
started in many sectors, but then expanded their fortunes mainly through investments in real estate














1. A New Gilded Age? 
 
There has been increasing attention paid in recent years to the “Gilded Age” 
(1870-1899)
1 and the claim that America has entered a “new Gilded Age” has become 
something of a cliché. What draws economists and historians to the Gilded Age is the 
combination of rapid income growth and rising inequality, and particularly the rise of 
great fortunes. This was the era famous for the capitalists known to their critics as the 
"Robber Barons."
2  Then as now, economists debated whether the Robber Barons's vast 
accumulations were the necessary price of economic progress. In this paper, I attempt to 
shed some additional light on this issue by exploring the origins of the fortunes of the 
Gilded Age. 
This paper is based mainly on two lists of millionaires published in 1892 and 
1902. They are similar to the Forbes magazine lists of the 400 richest Americans. The 
latter are still used by economists to explore wealth inequality, despite the availability of 
rich alternative sources of quantitative data, because the Forbes lists provide some 
unique information on the people at the very top of the wealth pyramid and their sources 
of wealth. Examples of recent use of the Forbes lists include Cagetti and De Nardi 
                     
1There is no precise set of years that constitute the “Gilded Age.” Most historians date it 
from somewhere in the 1870s to "around" the turn of the century. 
 
2Matthew Josephson (1934) popularized the use of the term "Robber Baron". However, 






(2006), Kopczuk and Saez (2004), Klevmarken, Lupton, and Stafford (2003), Poterba 
(2000), Broom and Shay (2000), and Canterberry and Nosari (1985). The lists explored 
here are even more important for the Gilded Age because the range of alternative sources 
is more limited. 
I am not the first to utilize this data. In 1907, the American Economics 
Association published George P. Watkins's "The Growth of Large Fortunes," which 
relied in part on the same lists. My main advantage over Watkins is not the century of 
study of the era by economic historians, nor important developments in economic theory 
that allow me to analyze the data with new ideas, but rather my ability to sort the data 
with an electronic spreadsheet. It was relatively easy for me to match individual 
entrepreneurs across lists, to analyze subsets of data, to examine secondary and tertiary 
sources of wealth, and so on. Watkins might have wanted to do these things, but it would 
have been time consuming. 
The parallels between the Gilded Age and today's economy, although far from 
exact, are striking. Technological progress was rapid in the Gilded Age. Possibly by 
1900, certainly by 1910, the United States had passed Britain to become the world's 
leading industrial economy. America's leadership was based partly on the natural 
resource endowment of the United States, more than Americans have usually been 
willing to acknowledge (Wright 1990). However, it was also based on the exploitation of 
those resources with new mass-production techniques. In itself, this is a positive story, 





  Perhaps the most effective voice in drawing comparisons between the Gilded Age 
and our own day has been Paul Krugman. Krugman (2007) stresses the similarity in the 
trends in the inequality of income in our era and in the Gilded Age. However, he is not 
concerned much with why inequality rose in the Gilded Age, but rather why liberals, to 
use the modern term, were frustrated in their attempts to reverse it.
3 Krugman's point, as 
I understand it, is simply that absent government-financed redistribution the capitalist 
process may, or perhaps he would argue will, produce inequality. My goal in looking at 
the Gilded Age is somewhat different: to try to uncover the forces that were generating 
rising inequality.  
  The story, to anticipate the conclusions, will be that many of the great fortunes of 
the Gilded Age were the result directly or indirectly of the diffusion of the new 
manufacturing technology. However, other forces were at work, especially the potential 
for the investors and entrepreneurs of the Gilded Age to make or increase their fortunes 
through investments in booming real estate and financial markets. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by 
exploring the major trends in wealth, income, and technology. Section 3 presents the new 
tables on the sources of Gilded Age fortunes. Section 4 explores in greater detail the role 
of finance and real estate in making and extending fortunes. Section 5 compares and 
contrasts the origin of fortunes in Boston and Chicago. Section 6 discusses the key 
                     
3At the time, they would have been referred to as Populists or Progressives depending on 





elements of the macroeconomic framework that encouraged the formation of great 
fortunes. Section 7 summarizes the main findings. 
      
2. Key Economic Features of the Gilded Age 
  Real GDP per capita grew a robust 2.50 percent per year during the Gilded Age 
(Table 1). A somewhat different measure of aggregate economic activity, real national 
income per capita, put together some years ago by Milton Friedman and Anna J. 
Schwartz, grew at an annual rate of 1.81 percent (Table 1). Growth, however, slowed 
during the Progressive Era; growth of real GDP per capita slowed to just 0.12 percent per 
year, and real national income per capita to .89 percent. If we extend our comparison into 
the 1920s, the real GDP growth rate figures for the Gilded Age and the era that followed 
become more comparable. The rate during the Gilded Age, in any case, compares 
favorably with the 1.81 percent rate of increase in real GDP per capita achieved in recent 
years (Table 1 and Figure 1). In terms of real wage growth, the Gilded Age again looks 
the best. Real Wages of unskilled labor rose 1.43 percent per year during the Gilded Age, 
0.56 percent per year during the Progressive era, and only .44 percent per year from 1990 
to 2006 (Table 1).  
  It is not entirely clear what accounts for the relative retardation of the Progressive 
Era and for the gap between our era and the Gilded Age. Differences in total factor 
productivity, which grew at 1.78 percent per year during the Gilded Age, .67 percent per 






year during the Progressive era, and .71 percent per year during our era (Table 1, line 13), 
may be part of the story. True, total factor productivity growth is not always highly 
correlated with real income growth; Alexander Field (2003) showed that the economy 
experienced its greatest surge in productivity growth during the Great Depression.  
Nevertheless, part of the explanation for the relatively strong performance of the Gilded 
Age may be the technological changes described below.  
  The aspect of the economy of the Gilded Era that is most often compared with our 
own was the rise in the inequality of wealth. Changes in the distribution of wealth during 
the Gilded Age are not as well documented as in today's economy. One reason is that 
there was no national income tax, or for most of the time, estate tax, to provide the data. 
The best data is for Massachusetts (Steckel and Moehling 2001). As Table 2 shows, the 
distribution of wealth, to judge by Massachusetts, was already highly unequal in 1870. 
Nevertheless, the share of total wealth held by the wealthiest people increased by a 
substantial amount during the Gilded Age. Between 1870 and 1900, the share of taxable 
wealth held by the top 5 percent of male households in Massachusetts rose from 57 
percent to 70 percent and the share held by the top 1 percent rose from 27 percent to 37 
percent. From 1900 to 1910, the first two thirds of the Progressive Era, there was little 
change.  
  More recent estimates of the share of wealth held by the top 1% have been made 
by Wojciech Kopczuk and Emmanuel Saez (2004, Table B1). The earliest estimate by 





estimate for Massachusetts for 1910, 35.0%, or even the Steckel-Moehling estimate for 
1900, 37.2%. The Kopczuk and Saez series declines sharply during the Great Contraction 
and World War II and remains on a plateau thereafter. Their series does not reveal the 
sharp increase in the share held by people at the top that might be expected based on 
concerns about a new Gilded Age, perhaps because the series ends in 2000. 
  To explain the strong performance of the Gilded Age economy in terms of growth 
– despite frequent financial crises – it is natural to look to technological change. The 
most important source of technological progress in the Gilded Age was the diffusion of 
"continuous flow production." This idea was described and developed by Alfred D. 
Chandler (1977, 1994), the leading historian of technological change during the Gilded 
Age. Rather than produce a final product batch-by-batch, factories were arranged so that 
raw materials could flow continually into and through the machines that turned them into 
final products.  
  The Gilded Age is often described as the Second Industrial Revolution because of 
the rapid diffusion of this new industrial paradigm. The First Industrial Revolution was 
based on the factory system. Large numbers of workers were brought together in one 
building so that each worker could increase his productivity through specialization – 
Adam Smith’s pin factory. However, materials moved fitfully through the early factory. 
Workers often carried raw materials or semi-finished goods from place to place. In the 
second industrial revolution, materials moved steadily through the factory, perhaps on 





  A few examples will illustrate the idea and show how widely this innovation 
diffused. The cigarette industry in which machines continuously turned raw tobacco and 
rolls of paper into finished cigarettes overtook the cigar industry, where individual 
workers sitting at their benches rolled cigars one by one. The great Chicago meat packers 
who produced slaughtered meat on continuously moving assembly (disassembly?) lines 
replaced the local butcher or slaughterhouse. Chicago, the poet Carl Sandburg wrote, 
became "hog butcher for the world." In Cincinnati, Dov Behr Manischewitz, a recent 
immigrant from Lithuania, mechanized the production of Matzo, a religious food, which 
for thousands of years had been baked by hand (Alpern 2008). Perhaps most important, 
Henry Ford began producing his famous Model T's on a fast moving assembly line in 
1908. The day of the custom-built automobile was over.  
  Eventually, electricity became crucial to mass production, but the technology took 
time to evolve and diffuse. It was not until the 1920s that electrification and Ford’s 
production-line innovations began to have a major impact on productivity (David and 
Wright 2003). In addition, as Chandler stressed, vertical integration of firms was a 
necessary part of the diffusion of this new technology. High velocity throughput required 
carefully managed supplies of raw materials so that production machinery never 
remained idle and careful management of output so that unsold inventories of finished 
products never piled up. The need to keep his cigarette machines filled with tobacco led 
James Buchanan Duke to contract directly with farmers, bypassing the traditional 





cigarettes nationwide. The need to keep their slaughterhouses supplied with animals led 
the Chicago meat packers to rely on the huge Chicago stockyards and to develop a 
network for distributing chilled meat nationwide with especially constructed railroad 
cars.  
  The question for us, then, is what connections were there between the rise of the 
great fortunes and the remarkable pace of industrial innovation during the Gilded Age. 
     
3. Sources of Fortunes in the Gilded Age 
  Chester McArthur Destler's, “Entrepreneurial Leadership among the "Robber 
Barons: A Trial Balance” (1946) remains one of the best-balanced and most thorough 
studies of the Robber Barons. Destler examined 43 of the most famous Robber Barons. 
Three, he admitted, had been genuinely innovative, Cyrus McCormick (farm machinery), 
Henry H. Rogers (oil), and George Pullman (railroad sleeping cars). Six others he 
identified as having “improved technology or processes in industry and railroading:” 
James B. Duke (cigarettes), Benjamin B. Hutchinson (meat packing), Gustavus Swift 
(meat packing), Phillip D. Armour (meat packing), Charles A. Pillsbury (milling), 
Cornelius Vanderbilt Sr. (railroads), and Andrew Carnegie (steel). Others made 
innovations in business methods, advertising, and finance. Although Destler was far from 





made some contribution that could be identified as “innovative.”
4 
  We can go further than Destler and examine the millionaires as well as the 
billionaires (so to speak) by exploring what appear to be impressively documented lists 
of “millionaires” and the sources of their fortunes published in the New York Tribune in 
1892 and the New York World Almanac in 1902. Sidney Ratner (1953) reproduced these 
lists in full, along with a detailed introduction. Public concerns about growing inequality 
of wealth, and about whether high tariffs and long-lived patents may have been 
contributing to the growth in inequality, motivated the construction of the lists. 
Apparently, these publications surveyed local correspondents asking about the 
millionaires in their community. The Tribune list in particular seems to have been 
comprehensive. Although there are many places the compilers of the lists might have 
gone wrong, scholars have generally been impressed with the effort put into constructing 
the lists and the accuracy of the results.  
  A million in assets meant something very different then than it does now. Using 
the consumer price index as the inflator, $1,000,000 in 1892 would be worth close to 
$23.5 million today (2007). Since the average wealth of these individuals was about $3 
million, we are considering people worth about $70.5 million in today’s money. The 
equivalent today might be someone whose annual earnings topped a million. Using 
nominal GDP per capita as the inflator (to get an idea of where the millionaire stood 
                     






relative to his fellows), $1 million in 1892 would be the equivalent of  about $182.2 
million today (2007), more than half a billion for the average "millionaire" on the list.
5 
 The  Tribune listed each millionaire by name and residence, and briefly described 
how he made his fortune. For example, the entry for millionaire John W. Stoddard of 
Dayton Ohio reads simply “Made in manufacturing agricultural implements, protected by 
patent” (Ratner 1953, 43).
6  J.C. Tullis of Cincinnati Ohio made his fortune “Largely in 
the manufacture of the rebounding ball; in part by speculation in horses during the war 
[presumably the Civil War], and real estate investments.”
7 Even John D. Rockefeller 
rated only three sentences. “Has made one of the largest fortunes in the United States, in 
the development of the Standard Oil Company and the Standard Oil Trust. He was 
president of the Trust, which recently dissolved.  His enormous profits have been 
invested in the best paying securities, and developing various important and useful 
business interests” (Ratner 1953, 77). As the last entry should make clear, the most 
important weakness of the list is that it does not give amounts; indeed, it does not even 
rank the millionaires. A second potential weakness is that it is unclear whether the 
                                                             
 
5Samuel H. Williamson, "Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar 
Amount, 1790 - 2006," MeasuringWorth.Com, 2007. 
 
6A major concern of the Tribune was whether the millionaire had made his fortune in an 
industry protected by the tariff, and so it systematically distinguished those fortunes from 
others. 
 






Tribune’s correspondents were making a determined effort to separate gross assets from 
net assets. This may have been especially important in real estate where it was possible to 
accumulate a large but highly leveraged fortune. 
  The list published by the New York World Almanac in 1902 listed fewer 
millionaires, and gave shorter descriptions. Tullis is not included in the World Almanac 
list. Stoddard is listed simply as a manufacturer, and Rockefeller is listed simply (and 
perhaps sufficiently) as “Standard Oil.” In part, the World Almanac list may be shorter 
because the depression of the 1890s knocked some people out of the millionaire category, 
but it is also possible that the World Almanac list was less complete. 
  Table 3 is based on the Tribune list. It shows how 4,050 millionaires made their 
fortunes. This was about the top .03 percent of all households, a very select group 
(Historical Statistics 2006, series Ae79). I reclassified the sources of fortune using a 
modern industrial classification (North American Industry Classification System) and 
then sorted the data. 
  Manufacturing was the number one source of millionaires, accounting for about 
25 percent of the total in 1892. The list includes the usual suspects: James B. Duke; 
“Manufacturing tobacco, President of the American Tobacco Company”; Philip D. 
Armour, “Has made a large fortune, as have also other members of the firm, in the 
wholesale provision and commission business, packing and speculation.” Some of the 
men who eventually amassed great fortunes by exploiting the new continuous-flow 





Hershey was still making caramels in Lancaster Pennsylvania. Henry Ford had not yet 
started his mass production of automobiles.   
  J. Bradford DeLong (1998) analyzed what he referred to as “billionaires:” 
entrepreneurs whose great wealth would be equal to about 20,000 times nominal GDP 
per capita. This cutoff leaves, according to DeLong, mostly entrepreneurs who built or 
financed railroads. The railroads were the internet of the day – binding the nation with 
steel rails rather than beams of electrons. The railroads, moreover, were intimately 
connected to the new technology. Lower transport costs integrated markets and made 
possible the large-scale production required by the new continuous-flow production 
processes. John D. Rockefeller needed the railroads to ship his petroleum to his 
refineries, at least until he could move to the more efficient pipeline. The Chicago meat 
packers needed the railroads to distribute their freshly slaughtered beef. 
  Our table goes further down the list of millionaires: the wealth of our 
entrepreneurs averaged about 12,000 times nominal GDP per capita. Many of these 
fortunes were connected indirectly to the new technology. The largest category after 
manufacturing and after inheritance (which was second with 20 percent) was Wholesale 
trade with 12 percent of the total. finance and real estate followed closely behind, each 
accounting for about nine percent of all millionaires.  
  Another striking feature of Table 3, one that also illustrates the close connection 
between wealth and the new technology, is the small role played by agriculture in the 





one would expect agriculture to be important. Even in the South, however, agriculture 
with 18 millionaires was less important than manufacturing with 38. Of the 18 
agricultural millionaires in the South, the Tribune explicitly identified only 10 with the 
great southern staple crops: four cotton millionaires, three sugar millionaires, and three 
tobacco millionaires.  
 The  Tribune also listed supplementary sources of wealth. An entrepreneur, for 
example, might have started in manufacturing and then expanded into finance and real 
estate. Alternatively, an entrepreneur might start in the wholesale trade and then 
expanded "backward" into manufacturing. An example will make the nature of the data in 
the Tribune list clear. J.C. Ainsworth of Oakland California, according to the Tribune, 
made his fortune “Steamboating on the Columbia and Willamette rivers in partnership 
with R.R. Thompson and S.G. Read; real estate in Portland Ore, and in the State of 
Washington, and banking.” We therefore coded transportation as J.C. Ainsworth's 
primary source of wealth, real estate as his secondary source of wealth, and finance as his 
tertiary source of wealth. It is clear from the discussion of the list in the Tribune, and 
from reading the entries for individuals where we have additional information, that this is 
the intended interpretation. Watkins (1907) did not make use of this facet of the data, 
possibly because sorting the data in this way would have been a time consuming task 
before the computer. 
  Table 4 sorts the data according to secondary and higher sources of wealth. For 





for 2,623 millionaires (4,050-1,427). Of these millionaires 727, about 28 percent, had 
expanded their wealth through investments in finance and about 52 percent had done so 
through investment in finance and real estate together. A tertiary source of wealth was 
listed for 1,155 millionaires (column 3). Of these 410, about 35 percent had expanded 
their wealth through investments in finance and about 61 percent through investments in 
finance and real estate together. Although other sources of wealth were important. It is 
clear that investments in finance and real estate were the major ways that capitalists of 
the Gilded Age expanded their fortunes after starting them in other sectors. 
  Table 5 is based on the World Almanac list for 1902. This source is not as helpful 
as the Tribune's list. Many estates are "not yet settled," and the most frequent listing is 
the unhelpful "capitalist."  The World Almanac list, moreover, does not include 
supplementary sources of wealth. Overall, however, Table 5 reinforces the portrait of the 
Gilded Age millionaires derived from Tables 3 and 4. Again, manufacturing was the 
leading category (after “capitalist”) accounting for 27 percent of all millionaires, 28 
percent if we omit the unhelpful categories of capitalist and not available, something 
similar to what we found for 1892.  While some of these fortunes were made in 
traditional industries, a reading of the Almanac list shows that many were the result of 
employing the new mass production techniques, for example Swift and Armour in 
meatpacking, and Adolphus Busch in brewing.  
  The 1902 list, like the 1892 list, also reveals the importance of real estate and 





manufacturing. Indeed, the number of real estate millionaires amounted to more than 90 
percent of the number of manufacturing millionaires, and together the number of 
millionaires in real estate and finance exceeded the number in manufacturing by a 
substantial margin. 
  One of the most severe contractions of the 19
th century occurred in the 1890s. 
There was a severe banking panic in 1893 and a steep recession from January 1893 to 
June 1894 and, after a brief recovery, another recession from December 1895 to June 
1897. How did our millionaires fare? Our data is not precise because of the 
impressionistic source of the data. Nevertheless, I was able to match 1,734 names 
between the two lists. A number of those missing in 1902 may have suffered a reversal of 
fortune. Table 6 summarizes the information on dropouts, additions, and matches (people 
on both lists). Again, Watkins (1907) did not pursue this question, perhaps because the 
cost of doing so was high in the days before computers. 
  The most surprising feature of Table 6 is the resilience in the real estate and 
finance categories. I had expected manufacturing to show the most staying power, and 
the speculators in real estate and finance to show the least staying power. However, this 
did not turn out to be the case. Real estate and finance were among the categories with 
the lowest dropout rates, while manufacturing was near the middle of the pack. Indeed, 
real estate had the smallest loss rate for any of the larger categories. Out of 473 real estate 
millionaires in 1892, 455 (96 percent) were still listed as millionaires in 1902.  





4. Finance and Real Estate 
  Evidently, one of the most surprising features of the lists is the large number of 
millionaires who made or increased their fortunes through investments in financial or real 
estate markets. Many of the financial and real estate fortunes in place by 1892, moreover, 
survived the financial panic of 1893 and the depression of the 1890s.  
  Part of the reason for the importance of financial markets is easy to document. 
Figure 2 shows an index of the total return (capital gains plus reinvested dividends) in the 
Gilded Age, the Progressive Era, and the recent past. Although the Gilded Age did not 
experience a boom as large as the boom of the late 1990s, in the long run it produced 
similarly high returns. An investment in the stock market at the start of the Gilded Age 
would have increased, on average, by a factor of nine by the end of the era. This is the 
average. Investors with foresight, a taste for risk, and luck, would have done much better. 
The returns during the Progressive Era, by way of contrast, were mediocre.  
The requisite national and regional series for real estate, as far as I am aware, do 
not exist. Shiller (2008) discusses the real estate boom in California in the 1880s, and 
there is some evidence for Chicago. Homer Hoyt’s (1933) history of the Chicago real 
estate market explains why real estate investments created or added to so many Chicago 
fortunes. Between 1873 and 1891, the total value of land in all of Chicago rose from 
$575 million to $1,500 million, a rate of 5.33 percent per year. In the central business 





1891-92, a rate of 9.24 percent per year (Hoyt 1933, 184-85). Because the price level was 
falling over these periods, the real rates of return were one to one and one half percent 
higher.
8 
  There is little doubt, moreover, that high returns in real estate and finance were on 
the minds of knowledgeable observers.  The term “The Gilded Age” is usually traced to 
the novel of that name by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner (1873); The Gilded 
Age: A Tale of To-day. Although the term “the Gilded Age” immediately brings 
industrialization to mind, the novel itself deals mainly with real estate. It satirizes a lust 
to get rich through real estate speculation, which runs through several generations and 
layers of society.  
  Another example of a writer preoccupied with real estate speculation is Henry 
George, the radical reformer and social critic, who advocated replacing all taxes with a 
single tax on land. He published his magnum opus, Progress and Poverty, in 1879. 
George began his career in San Francisco. It is interesting, therefore, to look at the 
sources of wealth in San Francisco. By 1892 there were 156 millionaires in San 
Francisco. The most important source, as might be expected, was mining with 33. Retail 
Trade was second with 23, and real estate was third with 18. Mining and real estate 
certainly conform to George’s idea that economic growth tends to reward those who first 
establish ownership of “land.” We need not agree with George’s policy proposals, to 
                     
8Lawrence H. Officer, "The Annual Consumer Price Index for the United States, 1774-





recognize that he was responding to a real aspect of the times and places in which he 
lived.  
  It was finance rather than real estate that most disturbed Thorstein Veblen, the 
best known of the late nineteenth-century radical American economists. In his classic, 
The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), Veblen criticized the flagrant spending habits of 
the men who controlled the great fortunes, in the process adding the term "conspicuous 
consumption" to the language. In The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904), Veblen 
dismissed the economic contribution of the men who had amassed the great fortunes. 
They resembled the eighteenth century pirates or the ancient Viking raiders who obtained 
wealth by taking it, and contributed nothing to producing it. It was a message that he 
emphasized again in “On the Nature of Capital: Investment, Intangible Assets, and the 
Pecuniary Magnate” (1908), published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, even then 
a prestigious journal. Veblen’s pecuniary magnates created wealth by speculating, and 
that meant threatening firms and stirring up trouble, so that they could buy assets cheaply 
and then resell when the markets they had themselves disrupted returned to normal. 
  My finding that manufacturing was the main source of fortunes, would not have 
deflected Veblen. In his view, it was not the men who were actually winning fortunes in 
manufacturing who were responsible for economic growth. Rather, the engineers who 
designed the new products and the means for producing them deserved the credit, even if 
they did not have control of the firms for which they worked. The real answer to 





replace it with a "technocracy" run by the engineers.  
   Mainstream economists generally were concerned about growing inequality, but 
advocated moderate changes in the economy. The British economist Alfred Marshall, 
perhaps the leading economist of the day, believed that much could be accomplished by 
changing social norms. If the wealthy could be convinced of the need to display 
“economic chivalry” much of the distress in society could be relieved (Marshall 1907). 
Marshall's call for "economic chivalry" has much in common with the celebration of 
philanthropy today. Perhaps the way to deal with the new robber barons is to convince 
them to do what many of the old robber barons did: to give some of their great fortunes to 
charity. Just as Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller turned over their millions to 
foundations, Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, have been persuaded to follow suit. 
  George P. Watkins (1907), my predecessor, saw the growth of large fortunes 
mainly as the byproduct of the growth of large-scale enterprise. However, he also gave 
some weight to activities that he thought were not particularly wealth enhancing for the 
community as a whole. Large enterprises, Watkins argued, produced large cities, and the 
growth of large cities in turn produced real estate speculation, a source of many large 
fortunes. Rapid change in the structure of industry, moreover, gave rise to volatile stock 
and bond markets where speculation thrived, and fortunes were made. Speculation, 
Watkins understood could enhance welfare in some circumstances: speculation smoothed 
prices over time. However, he also argued that speculative markets were an important 





(1907, 170) concluded that the growing inequality of wealth “may come to need direct 
attention from the constituted agent of society.”  
  Near the turn of the century, the Gilded Age gave way to the Progressive Era. The 
transition might be dated by the election of Theodore Roosevelt in 1902. The Progressive 
Era was in some ways a reaction to the excesses of the Gilded Age. Americans in the 
Progressive Era turned to reform, but not to radical reform. They did not try to stop the 
process of technological change that was reinventing their economy. However, they did 
try to ameliorate the negative consequences of rapid technological change, and booming 
real estate and financial markets. The great fortunes were attacked through the 
establishment of a progressive income tax, although to be sure, special interests, as is 
always the case, had a lot to do with the adoption of the income tax (Baack and Ray 
1985).  
  Many American economists, moreover, called for redistribution of income in the 
form of old-age pensions, and other transfer programs based on the social welfare 
systems taking shape in Germany, Britain, France and on a limited basis in some 
progressive states. The Civil War Veterans pension, which supplied incomes to a 
significant percentage of households, also provided a model. The veterans' pension was 
financed by a variety of internal taxes, such as alcohol and tobacco taxes, and by the 
tariff on imported goods. As Southerners repeatedly pointed out, it was far from obvious 
that it was an efficient or fair way of financing an old age pension: the consumers who 





pension were not necessarily poor. Still, as Theda Skocpol (1992) has shown, the 
veteran's pension was an important precedent for modern forms of social insurance.   
     
5. Boston and Chicago 
  A richer understanding of the national trends can be acquired by exploring in 
more detail the differences between Boston, a long established city where inheritance 
was a prime source of fortunes and Chicago, an emerging city where manufacturing was 
most important.  
  As shown in Table 7, there were 216 millionaires in Boston in 1892. Real estate 
was the most important source of millionaires, even in staid old Boston, but inheritance 
was a close second, followed closely in turn by manufacturing.
 9 The Boston millionaires 
were an extraordinarily diverse group. The "richest man in the city" was Frederick L. 
Ames who "Inherited a large fortune and has increased it. All made in railroads, real 
estate, telegraph lines and investments."
 10 Some fortunes were based on innovation, such 
as that of the bicycle maker, Colonel Albert A. Pope. Thomas Wigglesworth’s fortune, on 
the other hand, was “Made in East India trade and merchandising by his father.” 
Professor Alexander Agassiz of Harvard “Made his fortune in the great Calumet and 
                     
9This does not mean that inheritance played no role in the formation of real estate or 
manufacturing fortunes, for example by providing an initial stake. It just means that 
inheritance did not strike the Tribune’s correspondents as the main source of the fortune. 
 






Hecla copper mines at Lake Superior.” Martin Brimmer “Inherited valuable real estate 
from his father of the same name. Family has been rich for several generations” – a real 
estate fortune from an earlier generation. Charles P. Bowditch’s fortune was “Partly 
inherited from J. Ingersoll Bowditch. Made in the West India Trade and Bell Telephone” 
– an interesting combination of old wealth and new economy.  Eben D. Jordan of Jordan, 
Marsh, & Co., was a millionaire by virtue of a “Large business in drygoods, and 
investments.”  
  By 1902 inheritance had dropped to fourth place in Boston, accounting for only 
about 10 percent of all millionaires.
11 Real estate was still the number one source of 
fortunes in Boston; but manufacturing and retail trade had passed inheritance. Even in 
staid old Boston, coupon clipping had become a minor league sport. 
  Chicago provides a sharp contrast with Boston, but again suggests the importance 
of real estate and finance in producing and increasing fortunes. In 1892 Chicago, as 
shown in Table 8, boasted 280 millionaires, more than Boston, although Chicago was a 
much younger city. Chicago, in fact, was already second to New York in the number of 
millionaires.
12 Inheritance was relatively unimportant in Chicago, as might be expected 
in a newer city. The 1892 survey listed only seven millionaires by virtue of inheritance, 
2.5 percent of the total. In the 1902 survey, inheritance accounted for less than 1 percent 
                     
11 I have excluded the millionaires listed simply as “capitalist” from the calculation. The 
percentage would be lower if they were included. 
12 In Table 8 I have abandoned the modern industrial classification in favor of a 





of the total. 
  Manufacturing was the most important source of Chicago fortunes in both 1892 
and 1902. Several of these fortunes, moreover, were the result of the new continuous-
flow technologies. Meatpacking had produced 19 millionaires by 1892; and as we noted 
above, meatpacking was one of Chandler’s prime examples of how the application of 
continuous-flow processes produced greatly increased productivity, and vertical 
integration (Chandler 1977, 391-402). Farm machinery had produced five millionaires by 
1892. These were among the largest fortunes in the city because the McCormick 
Harvesting Machinery Company was located in Chicago. McCormick was also a pioneer 
in using vertical integration to maximize economies of scale (Chandler 1977, 305-06, 
408-09). Other forms of manufacturing had produced another 52 Chicago millionaires by 
1892. However, there were also many fortunes that resulted simply from the rapid growth 
of the city: in construction, the supply of lumber, wholesale trades of various sorts, and 
real estate. These activities benefited indirectly from the new technologies. The meat 
packers and the McCormick Harvesting drew labor to Chicago, which in turn increased 
the opportunities to make fortunes in merchandising, real estate, and related activities. 
Undoubtedly, Chicago would have grown a great deal, even if the new technologies had 
not added to the growth, simply because it served as a great entrepôt for the growing 
agricultural production of the Middle West (Cronon 1992). However, the role of 
technology in producing the great fortunes of the city is obvious. 
                                                             





  Entrepreneurs who started in one activity and then expanded into others made 
many of the fortunes in Chicago. The secondary sources in 1892 (in time, not necessarily 
in amount) included real estate (18 millionaires), banking (17 millionaires), and 
“speculation” mainly in commodity futures, mining stocks, and other securities (16 
millionaires).  
Previously, I mentioned Carl Sandburg's 1916 poem "Chicago."  Here is the first 
stanza of his famous poem. 
Hog Butcher for the World,  
Tool Maker, Stacker of Wheat, 
Player with Railroads and the Nation’s Freight Handler;  
Stormy, husky, brawling,        
City of the Big Shoulders: 
All in all, a fair description of Chicago’s economy. 
 
6. The Macroeconomic Framework  
  The foregoing discussion of the sources of fortunes in the late nineteenth century 
suggests several factors that made the years from 1870 to 1900, the Gilded Age.  
  (1) It was possible for some entrepreneurs to amass great fortunes by exploiting 
the new manufacturing technology: Alfred D. Chandler’s continuous-flow production. 
This does not mean, of course, that these entrepreneurs were simple technological 
wizards bringing inventions out of their basement labs. It often took, as I noted above, 





exploiting the advantages created by the new manufacturing technology. Many fully 
deserved the title of Robber Baron.  
  (2) Strong enforceable property rights encouraged investments in high-return 
markets. One could invest in land in Boston, as did Frank L. Ames, the “richest man in 
Boston,” or in Michigan copper mines, as did Professor Alexander Agassiz of Harvard, 
and know that law protected one's ownership. Lawsuits and political manipulation might 
threaten individual investments. However, in general large-scale private development of 
housing, mining, and agricultural land was relatively easy in the Gilded Age. Property 
was protected, moreover, whether owned by American or foreign investors. Inflows of 
capital from abroad helped increase the number of American millionaires. 
  (3)  The tax regime of the Gilded Age was favorable to the growth of large 
fortunes. There was no income tax at the federal level.
13 A federal income tax had been 
levied during the Civil War, but was allowed to expire in 1872. For the next two decades, 
the labor movement and the Populists pushed for a new income tax, but were frustrated 
by conservatives. Success was achieved in 1894, but in 1895 the Supreme Court ruled the 
new income tax unconstitutional. It would not be until 1909 that sufficient support would 
be mustered in Congress for a constitutional amendment allowing an income tax, and not 
until 1913 that the ratification process would be completed. Thus, whatever returns were 
earned in high-yield investments during the Gilded Age could be reinvested without 
                     






being subject to an income tax. A federal estate tax was passed in 1898, partly in 
response to the demands for revenue created by the Spanish-American War, and estate 
taxes were collected between 1899 and 1907. However, this tax came too late to have an 
impact on the accumulation of wealth during the Gilded Age. 
  The potential impact of low tax rates on the growth of large fortunes is easy to 
overlook. However, overtime the effect can be substantial, as a simple example will 
illustrate. A dollar invested at nine percent, the real return in the stock market in the 
Gilded Age (Table 1, line 10), doubled in 8 years. If the income had been subject to a 30 
percent tax rate, the same investment would have taken about 12 years to double. Starting 
from any given point, and assuming the rich save a larger fraction of their income than 
the poor, higher rates of return and low tax rates will cause inequality of wealth and 
income to increase more rapidly. 
  (4)  A shift from agriculture to industry, and the resulting urbanization, it has long 
been recognized, has the potential to produce rising inequality. This was one of the 
factors discussed at length by Simon Kuznets (1955, 12-18) in his classic paper on the 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality. In our lists of millionaires, 
we can see a particularly straight channel from urbanization to wealth inequality: the rise 
of great real estate fortunes in Boston, Chicago, and other American cities large and 
small. Today, immigration, suburbanization, and the shift of economic activity to the 







  Lists of millionaires published in 1892 and 1902 help illuminate the origins of the 
great fortunes of the Gilded Age. The increase in wealth inequality was produced, first, 
by industrialization. Many of the richest capitalists of the Gilded Age – the “Robber 
Barons,” as their critics knew them – gained their initial edge from the new technology of 
mass production; Alfred D. Chandler’s “continuous-flow production.” The Robber Baron 
was seldom the individual who invented a new technology, nor the first to apply it, but 
rather the first to use a new technology to achieve a decisive advantage in costs. 
  When we move down a notch from the most famous fortunes of the Gilded Age to 
look at smaller fortunes, we find many based on merchandising and investments in real 
estate and financial markets as well as manufacturing. Real estate and finance, moreover, 
were the most important ways that fortunes initially begun in other sectors were 
expanded. In retrospect, this makes sense: an economy in which people of means can find 
investment vehicles that pay high returns is likely to experience rising inequality. The 
idea that in recent years Americans became wealthy by making investments in real estate 
or financial markets, but that in the old days they became wealthy by making “things” is 
more myth than reality. Even in the Gilded Age, there were many paths to wealth.  

























Figure 1. Real Income Per Capita in the Gilded Age, the Progressive 
Era, and the Contemporary Era 
 
Real GDP grew most rapidly during the Gilded Age, less rapidly but more steadily in our 
era until the recent crisis, and stagnated during the Progressive Era. 
 
































Figure 2. The Total Real Return in the Stock Market in the Gilded Age, 
the Progressive Era, and the Contemporary Era 
 
The stock market provided high real returns in the Gilded Age.  
 










Table 1. Growth Rates of Key Variables; the Gilded Age, the Progressive 
Era, and the Contemporary Era 
 
  Growth Rates  







1870-1899  1900-1915  1990-2006 
A B  C 
1 Real  GDP  4.59  2.00  2.95 
2 Population  2.09  1.88  1.14 
3  Real GDP per Capita  2.50  0.12  1.81 
4  Real National Income 
per Capita  
1.81 0.89 n.a. 
5  Cost of Living  -1.55  1.20  2.71 (1990-2005) 
6  Wage of Unskilled 
Labor 
-0.12 1.76  3.15  (1990-2005) 
7  Real Wage of 
Unskilled Labor 
1.43 0.56 0.44  (1990-2005) 
8  Total Nominal Stock 
Returns 
7.20 5.07 7.65 
9  Total Real Stock 
Market Returns 
8.75 3.87 4.94 
10 Private  Nonfarm 
Output 
5.71  (1874-1899) 3.54  3.33  (1990-2001) 
11 Labor  Input  3.52   (1874-1899) 2.51  1.55  (1990-2001) 
12 Capital  Input  5.18  (1874-1899) 3.80 1.77  (1990-2001) 
13 Total  Factor 
Productivity 
1.78  (1874-1899) 0.67 0.71 (1990-2001)
Sources by Row and Column. (1) - (3), all columns, Johnston and Williamson (2007), accessed 
Nov. 3, 2007. (4), all columns, Friedman and Schwartz (1982, 122- 23). (5) - (7), all columns, 
www.measuringworth.com (accessed Oct. 1, 2007). (8), all columns, Standard and Poor's 500, 
total return, www.globalfinancialdata.com. (9), all columns, row (8) less row (5). (10) – (13), 
columns A and B, Kendrick (1961, 338-40). These estimates are for the “Private Domestic 
Nonfarm” Sector. Column C, Bartelsman and Beaulieu (2007, 468). These estimates are for 













Share of taxable wealth held by 
Top 20 percent  Top 5 percent  Top 1 percent 
1820 72.0  40.5  20.3 
1830 77.6  49.2  28.9 
1840 78.3  45.0  20.0 
1850 85.8  55.7  33.4 
1860 88.1  55.7  27.0 
1870 90.1  56.7  27.2 
1880 93.7  60.3  29.1 
1900 97.3  70.5  37.2 
1910 98.3  68.7  35.0 
 







Table 3. Distribution of Millionaires in 1892 by Primary Source of Wealth 














Manufacturing  996 24.6%  142  164  324  38  302  4  22 
Inheritance  807  19.9  402 80 220 18  68  0  19 
Wholesale trade  474  11.7  148 46 105 40 111  3  21 
Finance and Insurance  356  8.8  112  23 82 28 72 16 23 
Real Estate, Rental, 
and Leasing 
355  8.8 50 41 51 28  120  18 47 
Retail trade  353  8.7  103  51 54 19 83 10 33 
Transportation and 
Warehousing 
208  5.1  53  23  53 7 50 5 17 
Mining  147  3.6  11 3 42 5 26  15  45 
Construction  80  2.0  18 3 24 2 27 4  2 
Agriculture  69  1.7 9  5  1 18  14 7 15 
Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services 
66  1.6  18 6 13 4 18 2  5 
Information  53  1.3  17 5 14 1 15 0  1 
Utilities  27  0.7  5 2  11  0 7 0 2 
Not Available  22  0.5  6 4 8 1 1 2 0 
Accommodation and 
Food Services 
20  0.5  5 3 4 2 3 0 3 
Arts, Entertainment, 
and Recreation 
7  0.2  1 3 1 2 0 0 0 
Health Care and Social 
Assistance 
5  0.1  1 0 2 0 2 0 0 
Other Services  2  0.0  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 




1  0.0  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total  4,050  100 1,102 462 1,011 213  921  86  255 
 
Source and notes. Ratner (1953, 5-85). The regions are as follows.  Region 0: New York City.  Region 1: Maine, 
Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.  Region 2: New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, Except New York City.  Region 3: Virginia, 
West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee.  Region 4: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, 
and Missouri.  Region 5: North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New 








Table 4. Distribution of American Millionaires in 1892 by Supplementary 
Sources of Wealth 
 
Industry  2 3 4 5 6 
Finance and Insurance  727  410  144  31  14 
Real Estate, Rental and Leasing  644  291  72  23  4 
Manufacturing 348  108  34  11  2 
Transportation and Warehousing  277  158  58  20  6 
Retail trade  179  31  4  3  0 
Wholesale trade  168  32  5  0  0 
Mining  70 28 10  2  3 
Construction  47 15 12  1  0 
Agriculture  46 17 11  1  0 
Inheritance 29  20  8  0  0 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
28 10  5  0  0 
Utilities  24 19 13  9  0 
Information  16  8 1 1 0 
Accommodation and Food Services  12  5  5  2  0 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  2  3  0  0  0 
Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 
2 0 0 0 0 
Other  Services  2 0 0 0 0 
Public  Administration  1 0 0 0 0 
Health Care and Social Assistance  1  0  0  0  0 
Not Applicable or Not Available  1,427  2,895  3,668  3,946  4,021 
Total  4,050 4,050 4,050 4,050 4,050 
Source and notes. Ratner (1953, 5-85). See text for a discussion of the meaning of the 








Table 5. Distribution of American Millionaires in 1902 by Primary Source of 
Wealth 
 














Capitalist  840  116  186  216 42 199 36  45 
Manufacturing  730 67 137  199 46 261  8  12 
Real  Estate  679  106  115  202 27 190 10  29 
Finance  and  Insurance  353  114  34 58 19 78 26 24 
Retail  trade  184  64  25  34 5 38 8 10 




139  60  14  34 3 21 2  5 
Inheritance  98  34  15  39  2 5 0 3 
Mining  85 4  2 34 2 13  10  20 
Transportation and 
Warehousing 
69 7  8 18 5 24 0  7 
Wholesale  trade  73  21 3 15 7 25 0  2 
Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services 
44  23  6 7 1 5 2 0 
Agriculture  39  0 1 3 5  15  10  5 
Information  30  4 5  11  2 7 0 1 
Public  Administration  27  2 7 4 2 6 2 4 
Construction  8 1 0 4 1 2 0 0 
Accommodation and 
Food Services 
10  3 2 3 0 2 0 0 
Utilities  8 0 2 4 0 2 0 0 
Health Care and Social 
Assistance 
3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Arts, Entertainment, 
and Recreation 
3 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Total  3,564  641 606 934 170 924 115 174 







Table 6. The Change in the Number of Millionaires Between 1892 and 1902 
 
Classification 1892  Dropouts Additions  1902  Matched 
Manufacturing  959 -531  400 828 428 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  473 -18  254 709  455 
Capitalist  0 0  503  503  0 
Finance and Insurance  347 -131  170 386 216 
Inheritance  775 -582  23  216 193 
Retail trade  340 -219  89  210 121 
N/A  22 -9 130  143  13 
Wholesale trade  464 -387  28  105 77 
Transportation and Warehousing  207 -140  36  103 67 
Mining  139 -91  49  97 48 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
64 -32  25 57 32 
Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 
1 0 54  55  1 
Agriculture  69 -45  23 47 24 
Information  52 -36  15 31 16 
Public Administration  20 -9  16 27  11 
Construction  78 -66  4  16 12 
Utilities  26 -19  6  13 7 
Accommodation and Food Services  18 -7  0 11  11 
Health Care and Social Assistance  5 -4  3 4 1 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  7 -6  2 3 1 
Administrative and Support and 
Waste Management and Remediation 
Services 
0 0  0 0  0 
Education Services  0 0  0 0  0 
Other Services  2 -2  0 0 0 
Total  4,050 -2,316  1,830 3,564 1,734 
Source and Notes. Ratner (1953; 5-85, 95-106). The categories are ranked according to their 
importance in 1902. In each category, the 1902 number is the 1892 number less dropouts plus 
additions. The number of additions plus the number of matches (the number who appear on both lists) 







Table 7. Boston Millionaires in 1892 and 1902 
 
Classification 1892  Dropouts Additions  1902 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  42 -17 37  62
Inheritance 38 -20 5  23
Manufacturing 37 -18 34  53
Retail trade  35 -18 8  25
Wholesale trade  22 -17 1  6
Finance and Insurance  13 -4 13  22
Transportation and Warehousing  10 -6 3  7
N/A 4 -2 21  23
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 4 -1 1  4
Information 3 -2 2  3
Accommodation and Food Services  3 -1 0  2
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  2 -1 0  1
Public Administration  1 0 1  2
Utilities 1 -1 2  2
Construction 1 -1 0  0
Capitalist 0 0 75  75
Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 0 0 2  2
Mining 0 0 1  1
Health Care and Social Assistance  0 0 1  1
        
Total 216 -109 207  314














Table 8.  Sources of Wealth, Chicago Millionaires, 1892 
 
 





Percentage Number  of 
Millionaires 
Percentage 
Wholesale Trade  41 14.64 2  2.67
Real Estate  34 12.14 18  24
Manufacturing 33 11.79 2  2.67
Merchandising 29 10.36 5  6.67
Packing 19 6.79 0  0
Banking 16 5.71 17  22.67
Railroads 16 5.71 6  8
Lumber 15 5.36 4  5.33
Grain 15 5.36 0  0
Brewing, Distilling, etc.  13 4.64 0  0
Publishing 9 3.21 0  0
Raw Materials   8 2.86 2  2.67
Law 8 2.86 0  0
Construction 6 2.14 1  1.33
Speculation 5 1.79 16  21.33
Manufacturing (Farm 
Machinery) 5 1.79 0  0
Miscellaneous 5 1.79 0  0
Hotels 2 0.71 2  2.67
Medicine 1 0.36 0  0
Total 280 100.00 75  100.00
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